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As the title of this issue of American Studies suggests, globalization has 
become one of the most debated topics at the end of what Henry Luce termed the 
"American Century."1 To many observers, the pace of globalization has acceler-
ated over the last twenty years, bringing the entire world into a unified market, 
creating similar cultural practices, and a common set of institutional relation-
ships.2 From Los Angeles to Cairo, consumers can purchase the same Japanese-
made electronic devices, which were assembled in Malaysia or Mexico. Mean-
while, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acts like a global bank regulator. 
The United Nations has peacekeepers or mediators in some 20 countries around 
the globe. Aviation, telecommunications, finance, and the Internet bring societies 
together using uniform protocols. Some scholars have suggested that 
globalization's transformational effects are already so strong as to undermine the 
power of national governments.3 Others have suggested that the pervasive impact 
of globalization on traditional cultures and national sovereignty will inevitably 
provoke a backlash, a "clash of civilizations," a "jihad" against "Mc World." This 
backlash may endanger a nation's heritage, its distinctive culture and values, from 
what is now seen as a rapidly receding past.4 
Naturally, the globalization debate has enormous implications for the study 
of the United States. Globalization has sometimes been equated with "American-
ization," that is, the spread of American or American-style products, customs, and 
institutional models. Does this mean that we should re-write United States history 
as the rise of a society to global influence? Or should we re-write American 
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studies into the study of the society that represents, for good or ill, the blueprint 
for change in other societies? 
Questions concerning the role of the United States in the process of 
globlization themselves suggest broader, more general questions about the nature 
and scope of historical change. Globalization, as it is usually understood, assumes 
two things: first, that societies are much more intimately connected today than 
ever before, and, second, that change has been initiated from one dominant center 
and has radiated outward in a uni-directional fashion. These questions call for 
careful scrutiny. In order to understand adequately globalization in its historical 
context, we should ask, how have societies been connected to each other in the 
past, before the recent explosion of global changes that Deane Neubauer has 
described in his article in this issue? Has economic change been the crucial force 
in connecting societies over time, bringing political and cultural influences in its 
wake? Or have the actions of governments been crucial in shaping economic 
change? Do cultural forces operate independently of economic and political 
factors? And, has large-scale historical change been uni-directional, with one 
center from which dominant changes emanate outward, or has a variety of 
changes, some even contradictory, been typical in history? 
Immanuel Wallerstein has been one of the most prominent and controversial 
scholars to engage these broad questions during the last quarter century. In this 
article, I examine the basic elements of the globalization model that he has 
proposed for comprehending the historical roots and dynamics of what he has 
termed the "world-system." In the mid-1970s, Wallerstein, a political scientist, 
proposed a macroscopic model of interpreting large-scale international changes 
as the consequence of the development of this global system.5 Wallerstein argued 
that societies, first in Europe and then throughout the globe, have for centuries 
been linked by a set of unequal economic and political relationships. This set of 
relationships forms the "world-system." Rather than studying individual coun-
tries or processes, he asserts, we should investigate the world-system as a whole 
and the dynamics of the relationships that comprise that system. 
Given Wallerstein's macroscopic perspective and his emphasis on focusing 
on the systemic nature of modern world history, it is no coincidence that many 
scholars writing on globalization have been influenced by Wallerstein's empha-
sis on long-run historical change.6 On the other hand, many of the recent writers 
on globalization neglect Wallerstein's central insights on conflict and disconti-
nuity as features of the modern world-system.7 At the same time, Wallerstein, 
even as he has influenced social scientific thinking on globalization, profoundly 
disagrees with the argument that contemporary globalization represents a major 
break with the past. Wallerstein's focus on the world-system, a system that has 
had different centers at different times, is a useful corrective to the tendency to 
equate globalization with Americanization. Similarly, Wallerstein's emphasis on 
the intricate connections among economic, political, and cultural forces within 
the world-system suggest a complex model that transcends simple explanations 
that reduce globalization primarily to economic or cultural factors. 
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This is especially pertinent, I contend, because the globalization debate has 
recently threatened to become a fractured dialogue, with those emphasizing 
economic change and those concerned with culture going off in different 
directions.8 For one group of writers, globalization means economic integration, 
the expansion of Western-style or capitalistic markets into more areas of the 
world and an increase in the flow of goods and investments. Most economists, 
business leaders, and politicians, at least in the industrialized world, welcome 
these changes: 
All around the globe, socialists are embracing capitalism, 
governments are selling off companies they had previously 
nationalized, and countries are seeking to entice back multina-
tional corporations that they had expelled.9 
Others, concerned about social welfare and national sovereignty, fear that 
globalization may lower the level of social welfare and employment in industrial 
countries, while it simply exploits the working poor elsewhere. Globalization 
also threatens the ability of citizens or national governments to control their own 
destiny. The 1999 Seattle protests against the WTO and the attacks on McDonald's 
in France are dramatic manifestations of such sentiment.10 
At the same time, observers interested in cultural change interpret globalization 
differently. Focusing on popular culture—especially music and television—they 
see a movement that ostensibly breaks down nationalism, erodes ethnic stereo-
types, and unites diverse peoples around common ideals. "Forget modernity," 
Martin Albrow recently wrote, "Escape the stifling hold of the modern on our 
imagination. We live in our own time and the Global Age opens worlds up to us 
in unprecedented ways."11 Some of the confusion between economic and cultural 
or political globalization, and between globalization's positive and negative 
effects, can be examined through the strengths and weaknesses of Wallerstein's 
systems approach. Understanding why his approach was such a break in thinking 
about world history is a crucial first step. 
The History of World History 
Trying to write a history of the bewildering variety of world societies is, of 
course, not new. The liberal tradition has long argued that writing world history 
to account for the diversity of cultures from China, the Islamic world, and Europe 
is one of the defining characteristics of western society.12 Montesquieu, Voltaire, 
and Hegel in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries first grasped the extent 
of global diversity and developed a new kind of history, one that accounted for 
diversity within a common narrative. Voltaire and Hegel argued that societies 
could be classified according to the extent that they approximated a universal 
(usually European) standard of rationality ; Montesquieu suggested that societies 
diverged because of climate, geography, or religion. The key tension within 
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European views of world history is whether the world is converging into a single 
history and, if so, whether it is essentially a western one. The Marxist tradition is 
part of this same tension. Marx assumed that the history of societies around the 
globe would all eventually be determined by similar forces of class struggle.13 
After World War II, social theorists sought a new worldview and prefigured 
globalization theory. Modernization theory and its offshoots, political develop-
ment and the stages of economic growth, promoted by American social scientists 
in the 1950s and 1960s, represented a classic example of the argument for 
uniformity of historical change. In general, these theories broke with earlier 
attempts by European philosophers to embrace diversity. Instead, American 
social scientists came down clearly on the side of westernization as a universal 
process. As C.E. Black wrote: "Modernity takes the form of a set of characteristics 
believed to be generally applicable to all societies."14 All societies, in all time 
periods, would pass from a pre-industrial, pre-democratic stage towards a future 
that looked remarkably like the post-World War II United States.15 Yet in 
recognizing the enormous changes wrought by modernization, theorists sug-
gested societies changed independently, unaffected by each other. Societies 
varied only in the degree and rate of their adaptation to the external forces of 
modernization impinging upon them.16 
William McNeill's diffusionist model and Barrington Moore's peasant-
based Marxist theory represent two exceptions to the prevailing trends in the 
1960s. In McNeill's The Rise of the West, societies differ but they exchange 
innovations and ideas in an intricate web of conquests, borrowings, and modifi-
cations.17 In general, in the 1950s and 1960s, Marxism was on the defensive as an 
influential social science theory, but Moore made a radical change that preserved 
some of its explanatory power. Moore argued that what determined whether 
societies would become democratic was their experience in moving from an 
agricultural to an industrializied stage. Germany, for example, failed to alter 
relations between aristocrats and peasants, and, hence, retained an aristocracy 
that paved the way for fascism. By contrast, revolutions and civil wars in the 
United States, England, and France destroyed the power of aristocratic landhold-
ers and opened the way for democracy. Moore thus provided a powerful critique 
of modernization theory: modernization, in a political sense, was not simply a 
product of economic and cultural change moving hand in hand; struggles for 
power determined what kind of "modern" society emerged.18 Nonetheless, both 
McNeill and Moore found it difficult to deal simultaneously with power relations 
among societies and how they influence each other. McNeill did not differentiate 
power among societies. For Moore, the key was the power relations within them, 
not the relations they have to each other. 
Wallerstein's World-System of Power 
By contrast, Wallerstein argued that, while similar processes of change were 
occurring across the globe and throughout modern history, the structure of 
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capitalism and the system of states meant that radical differences would always 
remain among societies. At the same time, he synthesized economic and political 
factors more effectively than almost any theorist of world history or globalization 
had done. While economists and sociologists often portray the contemporary 
growth of markets as autonomous, Wallerstein argued that the more powerful 
states determine market growth. In other words, states, not market forces alone, 
have always guided capitalism. Similarly, strong states dictate how cultural 
globalization occurs. 
Wallerstein, who began as a scholar of post-independence Africa, contended 
that modernization, political development, and economic growth theories mini-
mized the inequalities that existed between richer and poorer societies. By their 
economic dominance over poorer societies, capitalist societies determined whether 
or not less-developed societies would ever develop. Certain countries could be 
trapped in poverty and kept as dependencies of capitalist societies. Thus, one 
could not simply treat all countries or societies as comparable units. For 
Wallerstein, time and place were critical. Thus, economic development and 
power relations were parts of a changing world system. 
For Wallerstein, since the 1500s, one economy—the world-system of 
capitalism—dominated. Individual national economies were simply part of that 
system. Thus, a society's place in the capitalist world-system, within the interna-
tional division of labor encompassing more capitalist industrial countries and 
less-developed agricultural ones, was critical. A nation's location within the 
world-system, rather than its internal class or power structures, determined its 
level of economic development and political structure—i.e., authoritarian or 
democratic. As Wallerstein wrote recently about his first theoretical statements: 
World-systems analysis insisted on seeing all parts of the 
world-system as parts of a "world," the parts being impossible 
to understand or analyze separately. The characteristics of any 
given state at T2 were said to be not the result of some 
"primordial" characteristic at Tl, but rather the outcome of 
processes of the system, the world-system.19 
In this model, rich, powerful "core" societies tend to develop democratic 
political traditions and structures. They live in part off the extracted surplus of 
poorer societies on the "periphery" of the world-system. "Weak" states, whose 
central governments cannot control powerful social groups, comprise the periph-
ery.20 Without control over their own societies, weak states on the periphery are 
manipulated by strong states at the core of the world-system. The unique feature 
of the capitalist world-system in Europe was that it was never a world-empire, as 
had existed in ancient Rome, China, and the Islamic world, but was rather a 
collection of states united in a world economy: "The secret of capitalism was in 
the establishment of the division of labor within the framework of a world-
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economy that was not an empire."21 This world-system, not individual states, 
should be the appropriate unit of analysis. 
Even though the economy was the basis of the world-system, states 
remained crucial to Wallerstein's argument. The capitalist world-system flour-
ished and spread, he contends, because states protected and promoted capitalism 
and suppressed anti-capitalist or "antisystemic" movements. Core states made 
capital accumulation possible, while periphery states facilitated the extraction of 
raw materials in alliance with the core and against the interests of their own 
populations. 
This world-system began, for Wallerstein, in the sixteenth century. The 
western Europe core extracted surplus from southern and eastern Europe, then the 
European and North American core extracted profits from the rest of the world. 
According to Wallerstein, if globalization were to represent the spread of the 
world-system, then recent worldwide economic growth would not be new: 
The years 1945-90 cannot be appropriately appreciated with-
out understanding that they are merely the latest period in the 
long history of the modern world-system, a historical social 
system which originated in the sixteenth century.22 
Thus, industrialization and modernization were powerful—indeed, defin-
ing—forces of modern history for Wallerstein, but they were not uni-directional. 
Poorer, periphery states might never develop industrial capitalist economies so 
long as they remained dependent economies. International economic ties in-
volved not simply the spread of industrialization or capitalism outward; instead, 
one region or group could be parasites. Class conflicts within nations, then, were 
less important than the power of one region over another. Yet Wallerstein 
recognized that societies or countries were not monolithic. Instead, capitalist 
classes in the core states established decisive alliances with ruling classes in the 
periphery. As two observers of Wallerstein put it, in his argument, "classes are 
viewed as transnational actors."23 
One of the ingenious, though also frustrating, aspects of Wallerstein's model 
was his use of the term "semiperiphery" to describe states such as Prussia and 
Russia that fall between the core and periphery, but partake of elements of both. 
As a number of critics have pointed out, the semi-periphery category allows 
Wallerstein to retain his model, but to explain a huge number of variant cases— 
undeveloped economies in strong states, for example—and to allow for change.24 
Competition and economic and political instability in the semi-periphery allow 
for constant tension and explain new emerging core states such as nineteenth-
century Germany and twentieth-century Japan. 
For scholars of American and Latin American studies, it is interesting that 
Wallerstein drew his ideas from the work of the social scientist Andre Gunder 
Frank, who argued that underdevelopment in Latin America persisted because of 
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unequal relations with capitalist countries such as the United States.25 But one can 
trace the origin of Wallerstein' s argument even farther back to the work of Eric 
Williams, who argued that slavery had been one of the foundations of the 
industrial revolution because it provided British textile factories with cheaply 
produced cotton fiber.26 Behind both Frank and Williams, of course, lies Lenin, 
who argued in his Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism that western 
European countries staved off proletarian revolt before 1914 by exploiting 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America.27 
Nonetheless, Wallerstein also represented a genuine breakthrough by com-
bining the central idea of economic exploitation with an historical analysis of 
politics. He did this by drawing on the historical work of the French historian 
Fernand Braudel and the Polish historian Marian Malowist.28 More generally, his 
work was instrumental in introducing American audiences to the Annales 
school.29 From Braudel and other Annales scholars, Wallerstein drew evidence 
that Europe had developed capitalist practices at least as far back as the fifteenth 
century. In Malowist's research, Wallerstein found the example of raw materials 
drawn from an underdeveloped economy with a weak state. Grain from early 
modern Poland was shipped to more developed economies—England and the 
Netherlands—that Malowist argued, exploited Poland. For Wallerstein, this was 
the original case of externally-driven underdevelopment. The Latin America 
described by Andre Gunder Frank or the Africa of the 1960s that Wallerstein had 
himself originally studied paralleled Poland and eastern Europe of the sixteenth-
century. Thus, one of the critical features of the world-system for Wallerstein was 
the inherent conflicts it contained. The western Europe core possessed strong 
states able to extract resources from their own societies, while eastern Europe, 
with its weak states, could not control their own social groups nor resist 
exploitation by the core states. 
Wallerstein has had an enormous influence among historians and social 
scientists alike. Along with the work of the British Marxist Perry Anderson and 
American sociologist Charles Tilly, Wallerstein helped spark a renaissance of 
"historical sociology" and "social science history."30 His work influenced, for 
instance, Eric Wolf, Janet Abu-Loghud, Michael Hechter, Michael Mann, and 
Alfred Crosby.31 More generally, Wallerstein's influence helped revive world 
history, reflected in the appearance in 1990 of the Journal of World History, 
which has focused on a more dynamic examination of how societies in diverse 
parts of the world have interacted.32 
In sociology, world-systems theory has become a flourishing sub-discipline, 
with close ties to political science and history.33 Wallerstein set up his own center, 
appropriately named the Braudel Center, at the State University of New York at 
Binghampton, and Review, both devoted to world-systems research.34 In 1994, a 
Journal of World-Systems Research began publication, most recently supported 
by centers of global studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz and Johns 
Hopkins University.35 Although having been deeply influenced by Braudel, 
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Wallerstein has had a reciprocal influence on Braudel. In the second edition of his 
third volume, The Perspective of the World, of his last major work, Civilization 
and Capitalism, published in 1979, Braudel reorganized his earlier work into the 
perspective of an emerging world economy. 
Wallerstein's Critics 
Since publication of The Modern World-System I, his first major world-
system publication, in 1974, Wallerstein's work has elicited criticism as well.36 
Critics argue that he emphasizes too strongly the role of international trade in 
explaining the deep-seated injustices against less-developed societies. The flow 
of grain from the Baltic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, for example, 
was only a small fraction of the grain produced in eastern Europe; Malowist may 
have overestimated its importance in re-feudalizing the region. Similarly, the 
relationship between exporting raw materials, on the one hand, and non-demo-
cratic governments and economic underdevelopment, on the other, is weak. After 
eastern Europe declined as a grain-exporting region in the eighteenth century, 
England, soon to be the industrial leader of the world and home of parliamentary 
democracy, was an exporter of grain for almost half a century.37 Nor is it clear that 
economic expansion of the core depended on exploitation of periphery econo-
mies. When the industrial revolution began, profits generated by all of Britain's 
seagoing trade accounted for only an estimated one-sixth of investment in the 
country. Britain itself, in other words, generated much of its own investment for 
industrialization.38 
Poorer countries often do not gain as much from exporting raw materials to 
richer countries as the value of the materials would dictate that they should. The 
terms of trade generally disadvantage poorer countries exporting raw materials. 
They do not control marketing and transportation systems, and more industrial-
ized countries take the larger portion of profits. However, this does not mean that 
exporting raw materials has locked countries into underdevelopment nor is it a 
major reason why some countries are rich. Until Europe developed dependence 
on imported oil after 1945, it drew relatively few raw materials from overseas.39 
Wood, coal, iron ore, and most minerals came from Europe itself. Oils, natural 
dyes, and rubber from outside Europe made up only a small portion of its needs. 
The one exception was cotton imported from the United States. 
Although Wallerstein's model has strengths that some recent globalization 
arguments lack, I agree with some of his critics that it has theoretical weaknesses. 
Wallerstein too often makes the pressure of the international market the primary 
shaping force on politics, rather than internal struggles of classes or other groups. 
Thus, Marxists and liberal theorists alike have criticized Wallerstein for neglect-
ing power differentials within societies. Why Germany in the 1800s opened 
successfully to international markets and Argentina did not cannot be solely laid 
at the feet of international bankers or merchants. Power struggles within states or 
societies make a difference, often the decisive one.40 
From World-Systems to Globalization 341 
Wallerstein also tends to collapse cultural forces into political ones and to 
reduce the role of states to fostering capitalism. Wallerstein usually treats cultural 
forces as manifested in political systems. Some of his critics argue, however, that 
the independent force of cultural habits that encourage entrepeneurialism or resist 
external influences cannot be reduced to different characteristics of political 
systems. In addition, as Theda Skocpol and David Held have argued, competition 
among states in war and diplomacy powerfully shapes the relations of states 
within the capitalist world-system.41 Similarly, such a significant international 
phenomenon as the movement of labor has never fit neatly within the capitalist 
world-system. Large-scale migration and expanding capitalism closely coin-
cided in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, however, protectionism 
has kept states from ever allowing migration to be as free as it was before, despite 
its benefits to capitalism.42 
Economists—even those writing on world economic history—have gener-
ally not embraced Wallerstein's model.43 Economists question Wallerstein's 
argument that economic integration—that is, increased trade and investment 
among countries—inevitably relegates poor, agricultural nations on the periph-
ery of the world-system to poverty. They argue that increasing economic 
integration, like economic growth, generally helps poor and rich nations alike, 
even though it has a mixed record on closing the gap between them.44 
World-Systems and the Study of Globalization 
Despite these flaws in the economics of Wallerstein's approach, I contend 
that his world-systems model still has much to offer in the current debate on 
globalization. Much of the recent writing on globalization by social scientists, 
especially sociologists such as Ulrich Beck, Roland Robertson, Tony Spybey, 
and John Tomlinson, has turned globalization into a cultural phenomenon that 
gives lower priority to economic and institutional change.45 Enthusiasts of 
cultural globalization such as Malcolm Waters even explicitly reject the eco-
nomic base of globalization. Instead, from this perspective, culture drives 
globalization, and economic connections follow from cultural ones.46 For ex-
ample, John Tomlinson argues that "Cultural practices lie at the heart of 
globalization.... [T]he huge transformative processes of our time that globalization 
describes cannot be properly understood until they are grasped through the 
conceptual vocabulary of culture."47 
In reaction, Wallerstein himself rejects use of the term "globalization" 
because he believes it distorts his central argument that the capitalist system is the 
crucial ingredient for transnational relations. He does accept the term "globalism" 
to refer to cultural trends that parallel economic dominance, but he rejects the 
argument that globalization somehow diminishes the importance of state power. 
The recent surge of international economic integration—growing free trade and 
international investment—is a continuation, he believes, of the historic capitalist 
world-system in which, he argues, states have always been the handmaiden of 
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capitalism: 
Globalism was not "globalization." As used by most persons 
in the last ten years, "globalization" refers to some assertedly 
new, chronologically recent, process in which states are said to 
be no longer primary units of decision-making, but are now, 
only now, finding themselves located in a structure in which 
something called the "world market," a somewhat mystical 
and surely reified entity, dictates the rule.48 
Wallerstein has also been uncomfortable with the notion that globalization 
is inevitable. He believes that the political dominance of core states is the linchpin 
for the world-system, and hence the instability of the 1970s and 1980s might 
herald the unraveling of the world-system. Never an orthodox Marxist, Wallerstein 
in the 1980s sounded very much like many radicals in arguing that a worldwide 
depression might be healthy in the long-run because it would undermine the 
world-system and allow some new system to emerge.49 In arguing that the 
recessions and protests of the 1970s and 1980s were signs of long-term decline, 
Wallerstein was part of the long tradition of western radicalism that has viewed 
decline as preparation for reform.50 Nonetheless, his assertion that the political 
role of the core states is crucial to world-system is an insight upon which more 
scholars writing on globalization need to build. 
United States History and Globalization 
In the twenty-five years since Wallerstein's Modern World-System first 
appeared, numerous scholars have published influential works that together 
suggest ways in which a new global history can be written. Many of them, like 
Wallerstein, use time and place as crucial factors that determine how societies 
have interacted.51 In many of these, the United States plays an enormous role both 
in determining the world of the present and in being shaped by the forces of the 
international market and European politics and culture. Migration to the United 
States from Europe, for example, was not a simple movement of people from one 
area of the world to another. Migrants had a variety of locations from which to 
choose; only a little more than half of the 55 million Europeans who emigrated 
between 1815 and 1924 settled permanently in the United States. By the twentieth 
century, many European migrants had no intention of settling, but were workers 
moving among labor markets. With the transfer of capital investment, moreover, 
migration contributed to raising wage levels in Europe and closing the gap 
between the standards of living in North America and in western Europe.52 
Underlying the economic growth of the United States was the American 
government's willingness to follow European core nations, particularly Britain 
and France, in keeping its security markets open to foreign investment and going 
on the gold standard in the Bland-Allison Act of 1878.53 
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In the area of international relations, too, U.S. isolationism can obscure its 
intricate connections within the western world. Although the United States lacked 
a land army and avoided direct involvement in European affairs in the late-
nineteenth century, it was still a major influence in international relations. It 
helped keep European powers out of China and Latin America, negotiated an end 
to the Russo-Japanese War, and, most important, created an informal alliance 
with Great Britain that freed it to face Imperial Germany.54 
Another way in which the United States can be seen as a part of a developing 
world-system in the modern era is in the rise of global institutions. During the 
nineteenth century, international agreements on cables, shipping, maritime 
transportation, passports, postal payments, health regulation, and financial trans-
fers established networks that are the foundation for globalization today. Contem-
porary standards for aviation, telecommunications, and satellite connections all 
were built on the foundation of agreements laid at nineteenth-century interna-
tional congresses in Paris, Brussels, and Bern.55 
The United States adhered to almost all international standards created in the 
nineteenth century, although it rarely led in formulating them. These agreements 
facilitated the tidal wave of immigration, investment, and trade that transformed 
the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century United States. Because the 
United States moved from being a follower to a leader within this web of 
institutions in the twentieth century, its role is crucial for understanding the 
institutions of the modern world-system. Wallerstein saw the world-system as 
dominated by exploitative core states; we still need a history of these global 
institutions that answers whether they have been essentially cooperative. Do they 
represent collective efforts of equal states, or hegemonic relationships, with the 
most powerful states calling the shots? 
Those who argue that globalization inevitably weakens the role of states 
should examine Wallerstein's argument that states and capitalism have always 
been partners and that the world-system has developed in stages over time. As 
Ronald Axtmann has argued, while economic globalization is a new phase in the 
way that states have used economic growth, it is not a radical break with the past. 
Cooperation among governments to promote trade, free markets, and select 
investments in exports are all historic mechanisms.56 
Contemporary analysts of globalization, both economists and cultural 
studies scholars, neglect this story at their peril because the pre-1914 era suggests 
that globalization is not inevitable and that conflict is as likely as cooperation. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century, observers saw a wave of globalization 
perhaps more powerful than today because it radically broke with the immediate 
past. In 1910, the French socialist Gustave Hervé examined the explosion of both 
global capitalism and international institutions and asked, "At the end of this 
evolution whose outline is already clear, who will see not a United States of 
Europe and of America, on its way to the United States of the World?"57 
Yet this wave of globalization was largely destroyed. Migration contracted 
sharply during the First World War and has never been as free since then. One-
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third of the international organizations created in the nineteenth century dis-
banded or disappeared as a result of the Great War. The imprint of the protection-
ism and nationalism created by the First World War and the subsequent Great 
Depression has only recently begun to ebb.58 Globalization, this history suggests, 
has so far not been a uniform, inevitable process. As Wallerstein argues, 
capitalism and the states promoting it are engaged in a power struggle against 
less-capitalist economies and states. Even if one does not accept the clear division 
that Wallerstein makes between core and periphery, his argument that capitalism 
has grown in an often destructive process through conflict is insightful. 
Similarly, Wallerstein's model allows for shifting locations of states in the 
world-system. He has noted the movement of capitalist leadership from Italy to 
Spain to the Netherlands to Britain and to the United States. Similarly, a careful 
study of global influences indicates that the outward spread of industrial capital-
ism from northwest Europe has spawned diverse waves of globalization. Indus-
trialization and finance spread British influence, while German influence was 
especially important in eastern Europe and Russia.59 French influence was 
particularly pronounced in Latin America. Thus, in many parts of the globe, 
Americanization followed British influence, and, more generally, Europeaniza-
tion.60 Today, as Japan's investments, trade, and cultural exports expand across 
East and Southeast Asia, Japanese culture is often the medium through which 
people in these regions experience "globalization."61 
It is problematic, furthermore, whether even economic institutions in the 
most powerful states—the United States, Germany, and Japan—are converging 
in form. Each preserves unique characteristics and has evolved in ways unantici-
pated by the uniform logic of capitalism. The U.S. anti-trust action against 
Microsoft would be unthinkable in Japan and Germany. Unlike the United States 
and Japan, Germany is deeply integrated into a transnational institution, the 
European Union. On the other hand, Japanese government ministries direct 
capital flows and economic planning in ways unlike anything in the United States 
or Germany. Cultural forces and unique political history remain strong.62 
One other virtue of Wallerstein's work is that he made resistance to the 
world-system an integral part of its history. Some of the most intriguing work that 
he and his collaborators have done is on "antisystemic" movements, simulta-
neous or at least comparable movements of protests, strikes, and reactions against 
what they term, using Gramsci, as capitalist states' "hegemony."63 Even they, 
however, usually focus on left-wing protests against capitalism and fail to deal 
with the equally common conservative reaction against globalization. In a 
language drawn from traditional American populism, one Christian fundamen-
talist in the United States recently wrote: 
Under the guise of free trade, the one-world parasitic apparatus 
has now apparently been contrived and has begun siphoning 
strength and resolve from this nation and others. The global 
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elitists now channel America's wealth, along with funds from 
other geopolitical and economic spheres, into Third-World 
countries at a rate greater than ever before. They constantly 
strive to solidify their one-world power base through material 
goods giveaways. They continue to create and consolidate an 
ever-increasing constituency dependent on the New World 
Order hierarchy for absolutely everything as those poorest of 
earth's people move through their miserable lives from cradle 
to grave.64 
Furthermore, a true global history of Americanization can only be complete 
with a history of anti-Americanism, a history still being written. Anti-American-
ism is as much a product of American global influence as the vast array of 
consumer products and services that often prompts it. The opponents of 
transnational cultural influences paint a very different portrait of American 
influence than do the celebrants of the blurring of borders and the global shopping 
mall. In one extreme but not atypical example, Alfred Mechtersheimer, a former 
German military officer turned Green Party politician, combined both traditional 
conservative and left-wing critiques of the United States when he wrote soon after 
the Gulf War that 
The continuity of U.S. American bloody expansion extends 
from the extermination of the Native American Indians to the 
perpetual intervention in Latin America, the war crimes in 
Dresden and Hiroshima, to Vietnam, all the way to the massa-
cre of Mutla Ridge in February 1991, south of the Iraqi city of 
Basra.65 
As we write the history of globalization and its discontents, we are moving 
into an era where, thanks in large part to the pioneering work of scholars such as 
Wallerstein, we will not be able to carry out the study of American history or of 
contemporary United States society without investigating the world-system in 
which the United States has been both an actor and a subject. It is also true that 
increasingly we cannot study world history or comprehend contemporary global-
ization without examining the critical role of the United States. 
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